The U.S. acid rain program, Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, is a pioneering experience in environmental regulation by setting a market for electric utility emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) and by including a voluntary compliance provision. Under the Substitution provision, non-affected electric utility units can voluntarily become subject to all compliance requirements of affected units and receive SO 2 tradeable permits (allowances). This paper studies the welfare implications of this voluntary provision and tests the adverse selection hypothesis of voluntary programs. The results indicate that although this provision has had a rather small effect on the overall performance of the SO 2 market, there has been a significant participation, mostly from units with counterfactual emissions (i.e. emissions in the absence of regulation) well below their allowance allocations, which suggests that SO 2 emissions have been higher than otherwise. An ex post cost-benefit analysis shows that this adverse selection effect tend to dominate the flexibility effect of permitting shifts in emissions reductions from high-cost affected units to low-cost non-affected units. On the other hand, participation with the Substitution provision confirms that electric utilities are choosing cost-effective strategies to comply with SO 2 limits and that transaction costs have been low.
can arise in attempts to implement tradeable permit systems in practice. Particularly if we believe that phase-in or less than fully comprehensive tradeable permit systems are likely to be the rule rather than the exception in future environmental policy. A salient example is provided by current emissions trading proposals in dealing with global warming that call for early carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) restrictions on OECD countries with substitution possibilities, known as joint implementation provisions, with the rest of the world (see, e.g., Tietenberg and Victor, 1994) .
There has been virtually no literature addressing the welfare implications of voluntary programs, in large part because few of such programs have been implemented.
In a recent paper, Montero (1997b) shows that in designing any phase-in emissions trading program with opt-in provisions, the regulator faces the classical trade-off in the new regulatory economics between production efficiency (compliance costs minimization) and information rent extraction (reduction of unneeded allowances). Furthermore, he indicates that an opt-in design far from optimal may yield no benefits. In a slightly different context, Hartman (1988) and Malm (1996) found strong evidence of adverse selection in voluntary energy conservation programs and concluded that the net benefits of such programs are significantly lower than traditionally believed.
5 Also relevant to this paper is the literature on the effects of both economic regulation (Joskow and Rose, 1989) and environmental regulation (Gollop and Roberts, 1983, and Oates et al., 1989) .
In this paper we study the welfare implications of the Substitution provision, the first voluntary program within an emission trading scheme, and test the adverse selection hypothesis based on actual data after the first year of compliance with Title IV-which is 1995. Our results indicate that although the Substitution provision has not had a significant effect on the performance of the SO 2 market, there has been a significant participation, with more than half of the affected electric utilities using this voluntary provision to reduce compliance costs. Unlike previous literature, 6 we find enough evidence that electric utilities are choosing cost-effective strategies to comply with SO 2 limits and that transaction costs associated to this provision have been relatively low.
We find strong evidence of adverse selection. Non-affected units have opted in largely because their actual counterfactual emissions (i.e. emissions in the absence of regulation) were below their historic emissions and hence, their allowance allocations.
Others have opted in because they had low marginal control costs, say, below allowance prices. While the latter effect reduces aggregate costs of compliance by shifting emissions reductions from high-cost-affected units to low-cost-non-affected units (the flexibility effect), the former may lead to higher emissions (the adverse selection effect). An ex post cost-benefit analysis suggests that the adverse selection effect tend to dominate. It is important to understand that the adverse selection effect was particularly pronounced in this program by the unanticipated expansion of the market area of low-sulfur coal from
Powder River Basin in northeast Wyoming (see Ellerman and Montero, 1996 and forthcoming) . Therefore, the motivation in this paper is by no means to ignore the merits of voluntary provisions, but rather call attention for the careful design of programs like this.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an overview of Title IV of the CAAA and the SO 2 emissions trading program and the implementation aspects of the Substitution provision. Section III contains a simple model that explains the trade-off between flexibility and adverse selection in a phase-in emissions trading program with voluntary compliance provisions. Section IV presents the data and examines the empirical evidence on voluntary compliance. Section V estimates the effect of the Substitution provision on SO 2 emissions, emission reductions, and the SO 2 market.
Section VI examines the importance of different factors in the decision to opt in and discusses possible transaction costs associated to this provision. Section VII estimates the adverse selection effect and carries out an ex post cost-benefit analysis. Concluding remarks are in Section VIII.
II. Voluntary Compliance with Title IV
The design and implementation of the Substitution provision of Title IV have been far from trivial. Large part of EPA's administrative efforts has been spent on this and closely related provisions. 7 To understand its practical implications for electric utilities' compliance strategies, we need to explain the implementation of Title IV and basic elements of the SO 2 trading program and related aspects such as the Reduced Utilization provision and the nitrogen oxides (NO x ) control requirements.
Title IV of the CAAA imposed a reduction of SO 2 emissions from electric utilities, by the use fully tradeable emission permits, called allowances. SO 2 is the primary precursor of acid rain and other acidic deposition, and the SO 2 control measures imposed by Title IV are designed specifically to effect a substantial reduction in those depositions.
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Allowances convey the right to emit one ton of SO 2 in the year of issuance or any later year and are issued to affected electric generating units 9 based upon a series of formulas heavily dependent on historic fuel use (see Joskow and Schmalensee, forthcoming) . Each allowance specifies a particular year, its "vintage", in which it is first available to be used to cover SO 2 emissions. Allowances are fully tradeable, in that allowances of any vintage can be traded to any party (e.g. another utility, broker, individual, etc.) and can be banked for future use, but can not be brought forward for use in an earlier year. At the end of each year, affected sources in the program are required to hold allowances in amounts equal to or greater than the total amount of SO 2 emitted in that year. To control for that, the CAAA requires each affected unit to have continuous emissions monitoring (CEM) equipment on each stack to measure actual SO 2 emissions and to report those emissions to EPA. 10 7 Brian McLean, Director EPA's Acid Rain Program, personal communication, September, 1996. 8 Discussion of the benefits of SO 2 reduction by Title IV can be found in EPA (1995b) 9 A unit, which is defined as a "fossil-fuel-fired combustion device" in § 402 of the CAAA, corresponds to a single generator and associated boiler. A generating plant can house one or several units, which may be of different sizes, vintages, type or fuel input. 10 A unit that fails to hold sufficient allowances to cover its emissions is subject to significant financial and legal penalties The penalty for non-compliance is $2000 for each ton of SO 2 emitted that is not covered by an emission allowance designated for that source. In addition, the subsequent year's allocation will be reduced by the tonnage subject to the penalty. Table A units and any Phase II unit that voluntarily opted in.
Let us first briefly explain the Reduced Utilization provision. Because electric utilities can choose how to dispatch their electricity, the incentive structure created by Phase I may encourage utilities to shift generation and emissions from Phase I to Phase II units. To account for possible shift in emissions through reduced utilization or underutilization of Phase I units, 11 Title IV originally required the submission of a reduced utilization plan for any Phase I unit that is planned to be utilized below its baseline as a method of compliance with the SO 2 emissions limitations. The plan must either (1) designate a Phase II unit, so-called compensating unit, to which generation would be shifted, (2) account for the reduced utilization through energy conservation or improved unit efficiency measures, or (3) designate sulfur-free generators (e.g., hydroelectric or nuclear generators). The reduced utilization plan however, is not required if either the underutilized Phase I unit (including any Phase II that opted in) surrenders allowances in 11 A Phase I unit is said to be underutilized if, in any year in Phase I, the total annual utilization of fuel at the unit is less than its baseline.
proportion to the reduced utilization, there is overutilization at other Phase I units in the same dispatch system, or there is a decrease in the dispatch system sales. Thus, the surrender of allowances does not become effective if the total heat input from all Phase I units in the relevant dispatch system is equal or above the total baseline heat input of such units.
On 
III. Flexibility and Adverse Selection in Voluntary Compliance

A. The Asymmetric Information Problem
Like any other regulatory practice, the optimal design of a phase-in emissions trading program with voluntary compliance options is subject to an asymmetric information problem in that the regulator has imperfect information on individual counterfactual emissions and control costs. 18 As explained by Montero (1997b) 
B. A Model to Illustrate the Trade-off
The implementation of a voluntary provision involves a trade-off between control cost minimization and information rent extraction, or between flexibility and adverse selection (Montero, 1997b) . For simplicity consider a one-period model. Let q be the aggregate quantity of emissions reductions, B(q) the total social benefits from emissions reduction, C TA (q) the aggregate control costs from affected sources, and C NA (q) the aggregate control costs from non-affected sources. As usual, we assume that B'(q) > 0,
, and B'(q) < C'(q) for q sufficiently large (these properties hold for both C TA and C NA ).
The model is depicted in figure 1 Table A Table A and substitution units are available, and where the original reduction target q TA is situated.
As we move the reduction target q TA to the right, marginal costs increase while marginal benefits decrease, and so does the negative effect of excess allowances. Finally, note that with the Substitution provision the equilibrium price drops from p TA to p TAS .
IV. Evidence on Voluntary Compliance
A. The Data
The data used to carry out the empirical analyses pertain to the period 1985-95, being 1995 the first year of compliance with the SO 2 limits of Title IV, and were obtained from different sources. Data on units design and site characteristics are in Pechan (1995) , and on emissions and utilization are in Pechan (1995) and EPA's emissions tracking system (ETS). Data on SO 2 control cost and coal contracts were elaborated from Ellerman et al. (1997) , the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Form 423, EPRI (1993 ), and EPA (1991 . Data on allowance allocations are in Pechan (1995) and in EPA's allowance tracking system (ATS), and on NO x control cost are in EPA (1991) . Additional data sources are explained as we progress.
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B. Table A and Substitution units
Participation with the Substitution provision has been quite significant. Phase I affected generating capacity has increased by 47%. Among the 42 operating electric utilities using this voluntary provision, 31 (of a total of 61) are "affected utilities" or utilities with at least one emissions. This is one of the main findings of our paper. We explore it further in the next section.
V. SO 2 Emissions and Emissions Reductions
To understand the effect on the SO 2 market and reasons for opting in we have to estimate the extent at which substitution units are reducing emissions or changing utilization as a result of being affected in Phase I. In so doing, we first have to establish what 1995 emissions would have been in the absence of the Substitution provision, or socalled counterfactual emissions. Table 1 shows that since 1985, SO 2 emissions for both Table A and substitution have been steadily declining instead of increasing as indicated in a recent EPA's forecast (Pechan, 1995) . Earlier research (Ellerman and Montero, 1996 and forthcoming) has addressed the reasons for this unanticipated decline and found that the continuing emissions decline was caused primarily by changes in the economics of coal choice, rather than Title IV, that resulted from the remarkable decline in rail rates for low sulfur coal from western coal (mostly Powder River Basin) delivered to higher sulfur coal-fired plants emissions rates separately rather than change in emissions -which is the product of heat input and emissions rates.
A. Pre-1995 SO 2 Emissions Decline
B. Testing for Changes in Utilization
We assume that electric utility operators maximize profits or minimize costs (Gollop and Roberts, 1983) , so the optimal level of utilization of a electric utility unit during period t (Q t ) is given by reduced utilization plan. 23 In fact, only 3,426 allowances were surrendered because of underutilization according to the Reduced Utilization provision (EPA, 1996) . Notwithstanding, Montero (1997c) R, is included to capture the effects on utilization of a unit that either is a substitution unit or is in a plant with Table A units. Note that the effect of Title IV on coal market prices will be captured by changes in p SP as we explain below.
Differentiating the output or utilization function with respect to time identifies the sources of changes in utilization (unit characteristics are assumed unchanged)
where
The first term of the right hand side in (2) represents the effect of changes in input prices.
The second term measures changes in operating costs when the units is affected by Title IV as either a substitution unit or because is in a power plant with 
where HT95 and HT93 are heat input in 1995 and 93 respectively, COAL is a dummy variable equal to 1 if it is a coal-fired unit, SCRUB is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the unit has a scrubber installed previous to Title IV, 29 TAPLT is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the originally non-affected unit is in a power plant with RETIRE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the unit is said to be retired before 1995 according to Pechan (1995) , and e is the error term assumed normally distributed with mean zero.
Our model in (3) is related to (2) Coefficient b 3 is also significantly different from zero but negative, which suggests an average decrease in utilization of scrubbed units of about 7%. 31 In a perfect integrated allowance and coal markets, the price difference between two identical coals but for the sulfur content should be equal to the allowance prices.
Although we found no evidence of changes in utilization due to the Substitution provision (i.e. we could not reject H 0 : b 4 = 0), our results indicate that Title IV has had a significant effect on units located in Table A plants (b 5 ) and through the coal market (b 6 ).
To explore the latter result further, we divide HIGHRTE between HIGH12 and HIGH25.
These are dummy variables equal 1 for units with emissions rates between 1.2 and 2.5 #/mmBtu and higher than 2.5 #/mmBtu, respectively. Results are in the second column are under Model 2. As expected the stronger effect is observed in units with emissions rate right above 1.2 #/mmBtu. Finally, the effect of RETIRE is as expected. 
C. Testing for Changes in SO 2 Emission Rates
Let us now test for the reduction in emission rates in 1995 due to the Substitution provision. To capture changes in coal economics and regulatory status that can affect the electric utility operator's coal quality choice (i.e., emissions rates), we follow Ellerman and Montero (1996 and forthcoming) and use a simple linear specification that relates unit-specific emission rates in 1995 to emission rates in 1993 and to unit characteristics. 
D. Counterfactual Emissions and Emissions Reductions
In calculating our counterfactual, we use actual 1995 heat input levels as the heat input level that would have prevailed in the absence of the Substitution provision, and predict the emission rate in 1995 from specification (4) for SUB = 0. Using the coefficient results of the first column of between 1995 allowances and counterfactual emissions, are expected to be about 250 thousand allowances. 35 Because of excess allowances, SO 2 emissions in 1995 and in the future will be higher than otherwise. This is the adverse selection effect. In section 6 we come back to this issue about whether the costs associated to adverse selection effect outweigh the benefits of the flexibility provided by voluntary compliance.
E. Effect on the SO 2 Market
From our model in figure 1 , we can observe that if an opt-in provision has no effect on allowances prices it does not have effect at all in the market. In our case, both emissions reductions and excess allowances whether they were anticipated or not can have an downward effect on prices. After the first year of compliance, however, the effect of the Substitution provision on the SO 2 market appear rather modest. First, emissions reductions from substitution units represent less than 6 percent of the total 3.9 million tons reduction observed in 1995 (Ellerman et al, 1997) . Second, in the likely event that excess allowances were not anticipated, they represent a small fraction of the almost 1.7 million ton of unanticipated reduction from Table A units by 1993 (Ellerman and Montero, forthcoming). Furthermore, excess allowances represent about 7 percent of the total of 3.4 million allowances banked at the end of 1995 (Ellerman et al., 1997) . This preliminary analysis suggests that the Substitution provision can explain only a small fraction of the lower than expected allowance prices.
VI. The Decision to Opt in
We have identified three reasons for opting in, namely excess allowances, low control costs, and the NO x grandfathering. In this section we use discrete choice econometric models to (1) disentangle the relative importance of these three factors in the decision to opt in, and (2) to see whether these and other "economic" variables can successfully explain electric utilities behavior regarding the Substitution provision. The latter is simply an attempt to estimate transaction costs associated to this provision.
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A.
Model Specification
The dependent variable we model, SUB, is the utility operator's decision to voluntarily opt in an eligible unit. We do not observe the net benefits of opting it in, only whether the decision is made or not. Therefore, our observation is
where SUB * is an index function that can be written as capture the benefits of having counterfactual emissions below historic levels and hence below the allowance allocation, we create EXALLOW that is the difference between allowance allocation and counterfactual emissions normalized by unit's size (capacity).
Counterfactual emissions, which are the predicted emissions in the absence of the respectively. 36 For a description of transaction costs in emissions trading programs see Stavins (1995) and Montero (1997 Second, to capture the benefits of having low SO 2 control costs can be more complicated since we do not have good costs estimate for oil-and gas-fired units. We follow two approaches. As a first approximation we use RTE93 and DPRB simultaneously. We would expect the higher the emission rate the lower the compliance costs since both the probability of finding nearby suppliers of lower sulfur coals is higher and control technology options are larger. 38 Thus, the coefficient of RTE93 is expected to be positive. We also believe that the closer to Powder River Basin (or any other Western coals) the lower the cost of compliance (Ellerman and Montero, forthcoming MCNOXG1of 711 $/ton of NO x . We expect the coefficients related to GROUP1, MCNOXG1 and MCNOXHG to be all positive.
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There are some other costs associated with bringing a Phase II unit into Phase I.
First, there will be a constraint in generation beyond the baseline. If emissions rates are unchanged from the "allowance allocation rate", additional allowances would be required to cover the extra emissions. Thus, we would expect that ceteris paribus a plant with a large number of Table A units should be less likely to include new units in Phase I. We include in our specification GNCNPLT that stands for generation constraint at the plant level. It is calculated as the ratio between total " Table A affected" capacity at the plant and the total capacity at the plant. We expect the coefficient of GNCNPLT to be negative. 43 Second, some electric utility staff have commented that uncertainty about the actual utilization level can be an important factor in the decision to opt in a Phase II unit.
If the level of utilization by the end of the year turns out to be larger than the projected utilization at the time the unit was opted in, the operator must acquire additional allowances to cover for the extra emissions. If the operator however, decides to withdraw the unit from the Substitution program, he (she) must incur the apparently non-negligible administrative costs of excluding the allowance costs from the rate base during that year.
Therefore we expect that the larger the uncertainty about future utilization the less likely the unit would be opted in. Since uncertainty has been found higher in peak units, which are relatively small compare to base load units (Montero, 1997a) , we use the inverse of installed capacity as a proxy for uncertainty level (UNCERT). Its coefficient is expected to be negative.
Finally, we expect that transaction costs or additional costs of using the Substitution provision not captured by our explanatory variables should be reflected in the constant term, a 0 . We expect this term to be negative. Conversely, a positive constant term would suggest additional benefits not captured by our variables. 42 Although not correlated, in some cases a high NOXPH1 may also mean a high MCNOXHG, so NOXPH1 would not be picking up the cost of earlier compliance with Phase 1.
B. Econometric Results
Because we do not have complete data for all observations, we work with two samples. The first sample includes all eligible units (eligible sample). The second sample reduces to 316 coal-fired units, for which we have EPA's (1991) data on SO 2 control costs and on NO x control costs for all Group1 boilers of the sample (reduced sample).
Summary statistics are in table 4.
The maximum likelihood (ML) logit estimates for the two samples are in table 5.
The effect of each independent variable on the probability of observing a unit opting in is presented in the form of odds ratios in the column next to the logit estimates. An odds ratio greater than one indicates that the odds of a unit being opted in increase when the independent variable increases. 44 Results show that almost all relevant coefficients are significantly different from zero and with the expected signs. Furthermore, they are quite consistent to alternative samples and model specifications.
Coefficients for EXALLOW and COMSTACK are positive and significantly different from zero at the 99% level, and odds ratios are greater than the unity in all cases.
In the second column of Model 1 for example, the odds ratio indicate that for a unit that experiences an increase of 1 in EXALLOW, the odds of that unit being opted in increase by 5.1%. Alternatively, if the odds of the event of opting that unit is 1 (i.e. probability of opting in equal to 50%), an increase in EXALLOW of one standard deviation (34.8)
increases the probability of opting in to 85 percent.
Coefficients controlling for SO 2 marginal control cost (RTE93, DPRB, MGCOST, SCRUB and CONTRACT) are less consistent but still significant in most cases. In Model 1, all coefficients have the expected signs and very significant but CONTRACT, which is only significantly different from zero at the 90% level. In Model 2 however, coefficients were either not significant and sometimes with the wrong sing. In fact, MGCOST turned out be a poor proxy for actual marginal costs, mainly because coal markets are in 43 One can argue that if a plant is 100% " Table A affected" no unit can be brought in, and gencnplt would be obviously very significant and negative. In our sample however, there are no such cases simply because those plants do not have eligible units. 44 The relation is: odds of the event occurring = probability event occurs / (1 -probability event occurs) continuous change, which can make earlier estimates unreliable. In Models 3 and 4 we retained RTE93 and DPRB obtaining better results. Although not significant, CONTRACT and DPRB have the right sign.
The benefits of the NO x grandfathering are found very significant and particularly well explained by either MCNOXG1 or MCNOXHG, as shown in Models 2, 3 and 4.
For instance, if we analyze the increase in the odds of a unit with a Group1 boiler that happens to have a high NO x marginal cost, we find the probability of opting-in increases from, say, 50% to 84%. This result is largely consistent with observations of actual substitution units with very negative EXALLOW but subject to the NO x grandfathering. Because, in order to benefit from the NO x grandfathering it is only required one year of compliance with Phase I, say, 1995, all these units are very likely to withdraw in 1996. On the other hand, the costs of early compliance with NO x seem to be either relatively unimportant compared to the NO x grandfathering benefits or not well captured by NOXPH1. Only in Model 1 its coefficient is with the expected sign, although not significant.
Results concerning generation constraints (GENCNPLT) and uncertainty about utilization (UNCERT) are almost always significant and with the right sign for the different specifications and samples. Finally, based on results for the intercept we find transaction costs or additional costs of using the Substitution provision not captured by our explanatory variables to be, on average, not significant. We only obtain a constant term significantly different from zero in Model 2, which seems to have specification problems since control costs are not capture at all.
The goodness of fit of our logit model can be evaluated as how many units are successfully predicted. The predicted value for SUB takes the value of 1 (i.e. predicted as a substitution unit) if P(SUB * > 0) = Λ(SUBHAT) > 0.5 and zero otherwise. As shown in table 5, the correctly classified rate varies around 80% for the different models. In looking at the misspredicted observations, we find that most of the substitution units wrongly predicted as non-substitution units are due to the NOx grandfathering not totally captured by our variables. On the other hand, among the eligible units wrongly predicted as substitution units, we find some evidence of transaction costs affecting a few units not taking advantage of their apparently cost savings opportunities.
In spite of the misspredictions, based on the above results we can conclude that the behavior of electric utilities regarding the Substitution provision can be well explained using "economic" variables and hence transaction costs appear to be relatively low. An important implication from this observation may be that there is no reason to believe that transaction costs associated to the overall SO 2 emissions trading program can be that large. This is entirely consistent with the large trading activity reported by Joskow et al. (1996) .
C. Competing Reasons for Opting in
In order to estimate the importance of the different factors affecting the decision to opt-in, we first test null hypothesis for (i) excess allowances, (ii) low control costs, and (iii) NOx grandfathering, separately. The χ 2 statistics, included at the end of does not permit us to conclude that having excess allowances is the most important factor in explaining the large participation observed.
Following Arora and Cason (1996) , we develop a more intuitive approach to interpret parameter estimates. Based on Model 4, Table 7 shows the relative importance of the different factors on the probability of opting in an eligible unit. Each row changes one or more explanatory variable(s) by one standard deviation and indicates the increase in the opting probability. The first row indicates shows that when all variables are at their sample mean values, Model 4 predicts a probability of opting-in of 32 percent, which is between the participation rate in the reduced sample (114/316 = 0.36) and the overall participation rate (182/620 = 0.29). The second row indicates that if all other unit's characteristics remain at their sample mean values but excess allowance EXALLOW increases to one standard deviation above its sample mean, the predicted opting-in probability increases from 32 to 84 percent. Among the single variables, COMSTACK has the largest impact, increasing the opting-in probability to 87 percent, as shown in row 3.
Rows 4, 8 and 9 indicate that having counterfactual emissions below the allowance allocation appears to be the most influential factor in explaining the large participation with the Substitution provision. 45 Control costs considerations, on the other hand, also appear quite important. This is entirely consistent with the emission reductions estimates of Section V. Finally, while the NOx grandfathering may seem less important on average, it is worth indicating that for some units it was the single most important factor in the decision to opt-in.
VII. An Ex-post Cost-Benefit Analysis
Our analysis here is restricted exclusively to the implementation of the Substitution provision. We take all the other provisions of Title IV as given. In addition, we do not include any administrative costs borne by EPA as part of implementing and running this provision, although we know they are not negligible.
A. Conceptual Issues
To calculate the ex-post net benefits we use the model develop in Section III, which we need to correct for banking. 46 When banking allowances is introduced, the costbenefit calculation complicates somehow. While all control costs from substitution units accrue today, part of benefits from shifts in reductions and benefits and social costs from excess allowances accrue in the future. This future can be any time between 1995 and the time the bank of allowances runs out.
From an intertemporal arbitrage condition in a perfectly functioning market, we know that in the absence of the Substitution provision, the net present value of the cost of reducing one additional ton of SO 2 in the future and before the bank runs out would be equal to the allowance price that would have been observed in 1995 had the Substitution 45 The same conclusion is obtained from other three Models. 46 Think of figure 1 as the first year of compliance, where q TA would have been the observed reduction from Table A units in the absence of the Substitution provision.
provision not been implemented (equivalent to p TA in figure 1) . 47 With the Substitution provision, we have that both emissions reductions and excess allowances from substitution units imply an equivalent amount of less reduction to be made, sometimes now and before the bank runs out, by the group of originally affected units. 48 Furthermore, the new equilibrium price would be lower (equivalent to p TAS in figure 1 ). The benefits of the avoided more costly reductions would be equal to product of excess allowance and reduction from substitution units times an average price, p , that lies between p TAS and p TA .
Because if p > p TA , it would be optimal for Table A units to reduce a bit more. On the other hand, if p < p TAS , it would be optimal for substitution units to reduce a bit less.
The costs of producing excess allowances and reductions from substitution units, which are zero and positive respectively, are also borne today. The social costs associated to additional SO 2 emissions from excess allowances are borne at the time those excess allowances are used to "replace" SO 2 reductions that would have taken place otherwise.
This occur gradually between now and before the bank runs out.
B. Numerical Results
In doing the cost-benefit calculation, we proceed as follows. First, the use the results of Section V to account for the 1995 reduction and excess allowances, which are expected to be 226 thousand tons and 250 thousand allowances respectively. Second, based on Ellerman et al. (1997 ), and EPRI (1993 , we use an average marginal control cost of substitution units of 55 dollars per SO 2 ton removed (hereafter $/ton). The control cost savings associated to the 1995 reduction by substitution units can be calculated as the difference between the avoided costs and the marginal costs of substitution units times the SO 2 reduction. Provided that average avoided marginal cost p will be somewhere between p TA and p STA in figure 1 , and that the Substitution provision is relatively small part of the SO 2 market, p cannot be much higher than the 1995 average 47 Because of banking and stricter Phase II limits, allowance prices should increase at some discount rate that discounted to the present are equal to actual prices. When bank runs out this is not longer true.
allowance price of $129. 49 If we take the latter number, the savings are equal to 16.7 (74⋅0.226) million dollars. In terms of figure 1, this would be area A(ABCJ).
Third, we calculate the benefits and social costs of excess allowances separately.
Benefits, the result of avoided control costs, will be approximately equal to present value of allowances price times the number of excess allowances, which is 32.3 (129⋅0.250) million dollars. In figure 1, this would be area A(ICFH). On the other hand, social costs which will take place when electric utilities decide to use the excess allowances to cover emissions reductions, will be approximately equal to present value of the marginal benefits of SO 2 reduction times the excess allowances. Estimates of (annual) marginal benefits of SO 2 reductions are clearly above actual allowance prices and vary from 314 to 2326 $/ton. 50 One might also argue that the marginal benefit of an extra SO 2 ton removed should not be too different from the expected allowance price at the time the reduction target was decided (about $300). In figure 4, this cost would be A(IDEH). EPA's (1995) . These estimates only consider human health benefits from SO 2 reduction. Because they are based on linear damage response functions, the marginal benefits curve tend to be flat in the relevant ranges. 51 Note that the numbers are highly sensitive to the counterfactual and the coefficient of SUB in equation (4). In fact, a 95% confidence interval for net benefits goes from -25 to 21 million dollars.
From a methodological point of view is worth explaining that an ex post analysis may not say much about whether implementing the program is efficient from ex ante perspective (i.e. positive expected net benefits). Setting apart legislative and administrative cost of running the program, failing to anticipated PRB coal intrusion in Midwestern coal markets accounts for large part of the unexpected negative net benefits.
VIII. Conclusions and Policy Implications
We have studied the Substitution provision of the SO 2 emissions trading program not only because it constitutes the first voluntary compliance program within a emissions trading scheme but also because we believe that an analysis of a program such as this represents a interesting case study of issues of instrument design that can arise in attempts to implement future tradeable permit schemes. We carried out empirical analyses based on actual data after the first year of compliance with Title IV -which is 1995 -in order to assess the practical and welfare implications of the this provision.
Our first result indicates that the Substitution provision has had a rather small effect on the overall performance of the SO 2 emissions trading program and on SO 2 emissions reductions. Nevertheless there has been a significant participation, with more than half of the "affected" electric utilities using this voluntary compliance option to reduce compliance costs. This observation provides further evidence to the notion that, in general, electric utilities are choosing cost-effective strategies to comply with SO 2 limits.
Consistent with that is our finding that transaction costs associated to Substitution provision have been relatively low.
In another result, we show that non-affected units have opted in, largely because their actual counterfactual emissions (i.e. emissions in the absence of regulation) are below their historic emissions and hence their allowance allocation. Other units have opted in because they have low marginal control costs, say, below allowance prices. While the latter effect reduce today's aggregate cost of compliance by shifting reduction from high cost affected units to low cost units (the flexibility effect), the first effect increases today's emissions and emissions in the future (the adverse selection effect). An ex post cost-benefit analysis suggests that the adverse selection effect dominates, in part because low allowance prices.
It is important to understand that the adverse selection effect was particularly pronounced in this program by the unanticipated expansion of the market area of lowsulfur coal from PRB. Therefore, the motivation in this paper has been by no means to ignore the merits of voluntary provisions, but rather call attention for the careful design of programs like this. We finish saying that it is hard to predict the evolution of this provision and the effect of excess allowances overtime. Provided that the allocation rule remains the same, there are several factors to consider. As utilization goes up, excess allowances should decrease. However, as units become retired and more PRB coal continues to move East, excess allowances should increase. We leave this analysis for future research. 
